TEACHING COMPANION
The Next Move
When does hiding a site pay?
Prisoner’s Dilemma, tit-for-tat, neoliberal institutionalism & neorealism · 60–75 min
Learning goals
- Compare a country’s two payoffs with its rival’s choice held fixed.
- Compare a first and last breach to explain when a short-run gain costs points later.
- Use the draft comparison to explain how institutions help sustain cooperation and why a rival’s relative gains can still matter.
- Test how a trade penalty changes a best reply and what could make a treaty rule matter.
- Distinguish a Prisoner’s Dilemma from a coordination problem in a fresh case.
Class setup & submission
Choose For Class at the start. Enter your name and, if you wish, your class or section. Finish the responses and checks to open your report.
Choose Download Class PDF in your finished report. If needed, use Print or save as PDF. Open the PDF to check your name and responses, then upload it to Canvas.
Students type their written responses in For Class.
Course materials
Before the activity
No advance reading or game theory required. Payoff grids and treaty excerpts are built in.
Syllabus description
Send Vela’s inspection order, then rewind the first or last meeting to see tit-for-tat at work. Decide whether to sign two draft agreements and explain why cooperation and the balance of power can pull in different directions. Then test a tariff fine and apply your reasoning to a historical treaty. Students produce a class report with a replay log, both draft decisions, a theory explanation, cabinet advice, a treaty analysis, and a rescue radio check.
Discussion prompts
- What did Vela gain immediately by hiding first? When could Orin respond? What changes when Vela hides last?
- Both drafts keep the same inspections and future meetings. What makes Draft B a different security decision for Vela?
- Why does a three-point fine make mutual compliance stable? How can mutual breach also be stable?
- Which record could help you test your treaty explanation? What finding would weaken it?
- How do the two possible radio choices show whether there is a dominant strategy?
What to assess
Look for both payoff comparisons, the timing of Orin’s response, and an explanation of verification and relative gains grounded in the student’s draft decisions. Check the treaty claim and evidence and the best reply to each radio choice.
Limitations
The states, crises and point values are fictional. Orin uses an announced copying rule in the repeated game. The treaty provisions describe legal rules. Historical behavior requires separate evidence.
Credit & permissions
Created by Yoav Duman. Free educational use, sharing and hosted embedding; software rights reserved. See the reuse information for software, artwork, branding and third-party materials.
Suggested citation
Yoav Duman, “The Next Move: Teaching companion,” Trouble in Common, https://trouble-in-common.ishmaldon.chatgpt.site/teaching/the-next-move. Include your access date.
ASSESSMENT & SUBMISSION
Assess the reasoning.
Set an endpoint and tell students which report or response record to upload to your course website. Use the activity’s own grading guide when available.
A suggested 10-point rubric
Give each criterion 0 points if absent, 1 if partial and 2 if clear and supported. Adjust the weighting to fit the activity.
- Concepts / 2
- Use a relevant international relations concept accurately.
- Evidence / 2
- Support a claim with a specific record or comparison.
- Mechanism / 2
- Show how actors, rules or pressures connect to the outcome.
- Revision / 2
- Consider a rival explanation or explain what changed your mind.
- Limits / 2
- Identify what remains uncertain and what evidence would help.
Before students begin
- Choose For Class if the activity offers a mode switch. Follow the endpoint your instructor assigns.
- Keep a progress backup when the activity offers one, especially before changing devices or websites.
- Review your responses and export the report or files listed in the assignment.
- Upload your work to the course website and check for the submission confirmation.
A progress backup restores a session. The readable report shows the work you’re asking students to explain or defend.
Prepare an assignment to share.
Edit this text, then copy it into Canvas or your course website. These edits stay in this tab.
Syllabus description & discussion prompts
Syllabus description
Send Vela’s inspection order, then rewind the first or last meeting to see tit-for-tat at work. Decide whether to sign two draft agreements and explain why cooperation and the balance of power can pull in different directions. Then test a tariff fine and apply your reasoning to a historical treaty. Students produce a class report with a replay log, both draft decisions, a theory explanation, cabinet advice, a treaty analysis, and a rescue radio check.
Questions for a discussion board or class debrief
- What did Vela gain immediately by hiding first? When could Orin respond? What changes when Vela hides last?
- Both drafts keep the same inspections and future meetings. What makes Draft B a different security decision for Vela?
- Why does a three-point fine make mutual compliance stable? How can mutual breach also be stable?
- Which record could help you test your treaty explanation? What finding would weaken it?
- How do the two possible radio choices show whether there is a dominant strategy?